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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from judgment rendered in the Third Judicial
District Court, J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, sitting without a jury,
dated April 6, 1990, in favor of Defendant against both Intervenor
and the Plaintiff, no cause of action.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Plaintiff and Intervenor, in their jointly-filed brief, state
two grounds for their appeal of the decision of Judge Frederick,
namely, (1) the decision is contrary to the evidence, and (2) the
decision is contrary to our state statutes and the decisions of
this court.
The standard for review of a trial court's findings of fact
is set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), as
follows:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of witnesses.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, in the case of Grayson
Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P. 2d 467, 470 (Utah
1989) :
A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no
particular deference; we review them for correctness.
(Citations) To successfully attack a court's findings
of fact, an appellant must first marshall all the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
1

that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings
against an attack under the Rule 52(a) standard. Re id
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P. 2d 896, 899 (Utah
1989); In Re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886
(Utah 1989).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Title 75-6-103

(1) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,

provides:
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all
parties, to the parties in proportion to the net
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless
there is clear and convincing evidence of a different
intent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This case involves a controversy

over the ownership of two savings certificates owned by Milton J.
Hiltsley, deceased (hereinafter "Hiltsley") , during his lifetime,
and left at his death in the joint names of himself and Defendant
(Ex. 3P and Ex. 4P) , and one passbook savings account (Ex. 5P) , the
proceeds of which were disposed of by Hiltsley during his lifetime
to help purchase a condominium for Defendant (Ex. 10P, page 253),
which was placed in the names of Defendant and Hiltsley as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship. (R. 583)
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

This action was originally

commenced by Plaintiff, for herself and in her capacity as personal

2

representative

of

her

deceased

husband,

Hiltsley,

against

Defendant, claiming alienation of her husband's affections, fraud
and undue influence. (R. 583)
The Third Judicial District Court, Bryant H. Croft, Judge,
after

a

non-jury

trial,

rendered

judgment

awarding

Plaintiff

$4,924.66, and awarding the Estate of Etta Wood, a non-party, the
sum of $43,623.43, and

impressing a constructive trust on the

certificates and the condominium in support thereof. (R. 97-99)
On appeal by Defendant, the Supreme Court reversed the case
and remanded it to the district court "for joinder of Etta Wood's
estate". (R. 584)
Etta Wood's personal representative was joined as a party, and
then filed his Complaint in Intervention, seeking a money judgment
against Hiltsley and the impressing of a constructive trust on the
certificates and condominium against Defendant. (R. 589-593) Cross
motions for summary judgment were thereafter filed by Intervenor
and by Defendant (R. 601-603 & 614-615), and the Court, J. Dennis
Frederick, Judge, granted Defendant's motion and denied the motion
of Intervenor

(R. 620-621).

On appeal filed by Intervenor and

Plaintiff, case number 890181-CA, the Utah Court of Appeals, in an
unpublished
proceedings."
C.

decision,

"reversed

and

remanded

for

further

(R.632)

DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW.

The trial on remand in this

matter was held before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, who,
after conclusion thereof, rendered his decision granting judgment
for Defendant against both Intervenor and Plaintiff, no cause of
3

action. (R. 686-687) It is that judgment which is now the subject
of this appeal by Intervenor and Plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

Etta Wood was the sister of Hiltsley and died on January

10, 1980. (R. 583)
2.

Hiltsley later died on August 26, 1981. (R. 583)

3.

At the time of Hiltsley's death, the savings certificate

at American Savings and Loan Association, number 11-013277-9 (Ex.
4P) and the savings certificate at Prudential Federal Savings and
Loan Association, number 003-300723-6 (Ex. 3P) were held in the
joint names of Hiltsley and Defendant as joint tenants. (R. 583)
4.

On October 29, 1979, Hiltsley withdrew all funds in the

passbook account at American Savings and Loan Association (Ex. 5P)
(R. Second Trial Transcript, pp.60-61) and used such proceeds to
help Defendant purchase a condominium which was placed in the joint
names of Defendant and Hiltsley. (Ex. 9) Said savings account, at
the time of withdrawal, was held
Plaintiff

and

in the names of Hiltsley,

Defendant, as joint tenants.

(R. Second Trial

Transcript, p.48)
5. That an entry in Hiltsley's journal (Ex. 10) on page 253,
under date of October 5, 1979, states:
Received money from Etta's account, transferred to Salt
Lake
from Albuquerque, N M, $30,000, plus 314- a
shortage of $8.+. The AM Savings wiLl check this shortage
for me- Placed- $11,000.00 in Savings passbook,
$10,000.00 in money market at AM Savings, $10,000.00 in
money market @ PFS." (Ex. 10P, page 253)
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6.

The Plaintiff had made no deposit to or withdrawal from

these certificates and passbook account, and had no knowledge of
them until shortly after Hiltsley's death. (R. 57-61, and 185-186)
7.

At the trial, no evidence was presented that would enable

the court to determine that Hiltsley exercised dominance, undue
influence

or

inappropriate

influence

over

Etta

Wood

or

her

property. (R. 679-680)
8.

At the trial, no evidence was elicited as to why the money

was provided to Hiltsley or in what capacity he held or received
it. (R. 680)
9.

That there was insufficient evidence produced at trial

to support the judgment of Judge Croft in favor of Plaintiff (R.
680)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

The Plaintiff and Intervenor not only failed to establish

by clear and convincing evidence the elements of a constructive
trust, they failed to present any such evidence.

2.

The trial court, Judge Frederick, correctly applied the

law as to the claim of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and
as to ownership of joint bank accounts, and specifically the law
of this case on constructive trusts as given it on reversal and
remand by the Utah Supreme Court in Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d
1024 (Utah 1987) .

5

3.

The appeal of Plaintiff and Intervenor is without merit,

having no legal or factual basis, the evidence and

law are

misstated and mischaracterized in their Brief filed on appeal, and
Defendant is entitled to sanctions and damages as provided by the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF AND INTERVENOR HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.
Intervenor and Plaintiff have failed to sustain their burden
of proof to support a claim of a constructive trust.

The trial

court, Judge Frederick, so found. (R. 679-680) Intervenor and
Plaintiff, at the trial, seemed content to rely upon

(1) the

journal entry of Hiltsley (Exhibit 10-P, page 253), i.e., that he
had received funds from his sister and had made deposits of those
funds in several accounts, and (2) the collateral estoppel effect
of the earlier decision of Judge Croft which had
constructive trust on those funds.

imposed a

No additional evidence was

introduced at the trial before Judge Frederick. (R. Second Trial
Transcript, p.7)

It is further noteworthy that the Complaint in

Intervention makes no allegation of any fact which would support
a finding of a constructive trust, except the bare allegation of
a breach by Hiltsley of a confidential relationship with his
sister.

(R. 590)

This was done in total disregard

6

for the

instructions on remand given the trial court and counsel in the
Supreme Court's earlier decision, Hiltsley v. Ryder, supra, in
footnote 5, as follows:
In making this disposition, we in no way rule upon
the merits of the constructive trust issue. To do so
would be improper since the record was developed without
representation by Etta Woods' estate. However, for the
benefit of the trial court, we refer to it Ashton v.
Ashton. 733 P. 2d 147, 151-52 (Utah 1987), and Baker v.
Pattee, 684 P. 2d 632, 636, 637 (Utah 1984). (R. 584)
and the specific instructions given by Justice Zimmerman, in his
concurring opinion, as follows:
The burden of proof is upon the one asserting a
constructive trust to show by clear and convincing
evidence that equitable grounds for imposing a trust
exist. Baker v. Pattee. 684 P. 2d 632, 637 (Utah ,1984);
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca. 572 P. 2d 710; Neilson v.
Rasmussen. 558 P. 2d 511, 513 (Utah 1976); Matter of
Estate of Hock. 655 P. 2d 1111, 1114 (Utah (1982). This
burden cannot be met by simply showing that there was a
transaction between the parties apparently to the benefit
of one and that they had a close family relationship.
(R. 585)
In the case of Close v. Adams. 657 P. 2d 1351, 1352-53 (Utah
1983), Justice Durham, writing for an unanimous court states:
The present case arises out of a dispute over
ownership of the stock.... In support of her constructive
trust theory, the respondent claimed that Edith Branscom
was under the undue influence of the appellant.... This
Court has previously stated that a "constructive trust
is an equitable remedy to prevent uniust enrichment."
In Re: Estate of Hock. Utah. 655 P. 2d 1111, 1114 (1982)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). In In re Estate of
Hock, this Court continued:
None of the parties disputes the findings
that... Ruth did not engage in any fraud, bad
faith or breach of a fiduciary responsibility.
In light of this undisputed finding, the
doctrine of constructive trust is inapplicable.
7

Id, , at 1115.
In the present case, the trial
court's findings do not show that the appellant engaged
in any fraud or other wrong doing, nor do they establish
any other grounds for imposing a constructive trust. See
In re Estate of Hock, supra; Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §§44 and 45 (1959) ; 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts,
§§461-473 at 3410-53 (1967). In fact, the trial court
found specifically that Edith Branscom "was free of undue
influence of the family." As a result, the doctrine of
constructive trust is inapplicable and the trial court's
imposition of a constructive trust was in error.
We
therefore reverse the judgment.
In Estate of Coffin, 671 P. 2d 921 (Ariz. App. 1983), a case
cited to by Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion in Hiltsley
v. Ryder, supra, the Court of Appeals of Arizona, in considering
whether a constructive trust on the assets of the estate should
have been imposed, held:
We preliminarily note that there is no allegation
that the mother promised to reconvey the property to
appellant, or that the property was conveyed to her
mother in exchange for a promise to leave the property
to appellant in her will or make appellant an heir. In
fact, there is no allegation whatsoever that the mother
induced appellant in any manner whatsoever to deed the
property to her. But the crucial omissions in this case
are allegations of facts which would show a confidential
relationship.
It has long been the law in this state
that the existence of a family relationship without more
is not sufficient to create a constructive trust.
(Citations) In order to impose a constructive trust, in
addition to the family relationship, there must be shown
age and infirmity on one hand, actual dominance on the
part of the grantee, an established course of management
of the grantors affairs by the grantee, or other similar
facts making it inequitable to allow the grantee to
prevail. (Citations) Appellant's reliance solely on the
relationship of mother and child is insufficient to show
a confidential relationship and therefore insufficient
to establish a constructive trust. (Emphasis added)
Judge Frederick made specific findings that no evidence was
offered

showing

dominance,

undue

influence

or

inappropriate

influence, or in what capacity Hiltsley received or held the money.
8

(R. 679-680)
As

to

the

bare

allegations

contained

in

Intervener's

Complaint, that Hiltsley breached his confidential relationship
with Etta Wood, no evidence was offered at the trial to show a
confidential relationship. The law with respect to a confidential
relationship is set forth in the case of Webster v. Lehmer, 724 P.
2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1987), quoting Bradbury, 16 Utah 2d 383, 401
P. 2d 713, wherein it is held:
The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon
the principal of inequality between the parties, and
implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the
parties over the other.
This holding was followed in the case of Mattes v. Olearain,
759 P. 2d 1117, 1179 (Utah App. 1988), which case also cited
Hiltsley v. Ryder, supra, for the position that one must show facts
indicating grantor's weakness and grantee's dominance to show a
confidential relationship.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW APPLICABLE TO
THE ISSUES RAISED AT TRIAL.
Plaintiff claims the trial court did not correctly apply the
law of joint accounts but cites a statute and cases dealing with
joint ownership of real property.

Clearly, such statute and

cases

are irrelevant and immaterial to the ownership of jointly held bank
accounts and certificates.
JOINT TENANCY.

The law relative to ownership of a joint

account during the lifetime of the parties thereto is set forth in
9

Title §75-6-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which
states:
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all
parties, to the parties in proportion to the net
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless
there is clear and convincing evidence of a different
intent.
Title §75-6-101 (6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
defines net contributions as follows:
"Net contribution" of a party to a joint account as
of any given time is the sum of all deposits to it made
by or for him, less all withdrawals made by or for him
which have not been paid to or applied to the use of any
other party, plus a prorata share of any interest or
dividends included in the current balance. The term
includes, in addition, any proceeds of deposit, life
insurance added to the account by reason of the death of
the party whose net contribution is in question.
As regards the claim of the plaintiff that she had an
ownership interest in the American Savings and Loan Ass'n account
closed by Hiltsley during his lifetime, by virtue of the account
being a "tenancy in common" account, which interest could not be
alienated by her husband during his lifetime, the account was in
fact a joint tenancy account (R. Second Trial Transcript p.48),
and even had it not been, Plaintiff would not have acquired any
present interest in the account.

Defendant refers this court to

the last two sentences of the Editorial Board Comment following
Title §75-6-103, wherein it is stated:
The theory of these sections is that the basic
relationship of the parties is that of individual
ownership of values attributable to their respective
deposits and withdrawals; the right of survivorship which
attaches unless negated by the form of the account really
is a right to the values theretofore owned by another
which the survivor receives for the first time at the
death of the owner. That is to say, the account operates
10

as a valid disposition at death rather than as a present
joint tenant, (Emphasis added)
The Plaintiff had made no deposit to or withdrawal from the
certificates or savings accounts and she knew nothing of them until
after Hiltsley's death. (R. 57-61, and 185-186) (R. Second Trial
Transcript, p.91)
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of First Security Bank of
Utah v. Demiris, 354 P. 2d 97 (Utah 1960) , cites with approval the
language of the New York case of In re Kelley's Willr (1933), 146
Misc. 353, 263 N.Y.S. 661, 667:
The withdrawal of monies from a joint account does
not destroy a joint tenancy, if one was created. It
merely opens the doors to competent evidence, if
available, that no joint tenancy was originally created
or intended.
It follows, therefore, that Hiltsley had the absolute right
to withdraw the monies from his account for purposes satisfactory
to him and the plaintiff had no interest in those monies unless and
until the decedent died leaving the account in her joint name.
With respect to the two savings certificates remaining at
Hiltsley's death in his name and Defendant's, as joint tenants,
neither Plaintiff nor Intervenor made any allegation in their
respective complaints, nor did either offer any evidence at trial,
of a different intention on the part of Hiltsley than to have the
surviving joint tenant receive the funds in the savings accounts
or certificates upon his death. In fact, the Will of the decedent,
executed August 9, 1978 (Ex.6P), offered into evidence by plaintiff
states:

11

Thirdly, I direct all savings certificates, savings
accounts and checking accounts held jointly by myself and
another, shall become the sole property of such surviving
co-signer.
B.

RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.

Res judicata and

collateral estoppel have no application to the issues presented on
this appeal.
It is an elementary rule of law that the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel are not available where the
decision or judgment upon which they are sought to be applied has
been reversed.

In 50 C.J.S., Judgments §702, p.157, it says:

A judgment is of no force whatever as an estoppel
after it has been effectually vacated or annulled, as
where is has been reversed on appeal, ...
In 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal & Error, §955, in speaking of the
general effect of a reversal, the treatise states, at page 382:
The reversal sets the matter at large for
read judication of all issues involved in the case and
recovery may be had in the second trial for items of
damage not awarded in the first. The case may be retried
in the light of knowledge acquired since the former
trial, and defenses not made on the first trial may be
entertained. All proceedings had under the judgment are,
as between the immediate parties at least, ipso facto
void and of no effect. However, the opinion of the court
on appeal must be followed so far as applicable, for the
principals of law stated therein must be regarded as the
law of the case on the second trial.
In the case of Community Bank v. Vassil, 570 P. 2d 66, 68
(Ore. 1977), the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon said:
We need not address the issues raised by Defendant's
first assignment of error in the present case. Even
assuming that the issues in the Ell case were the same
as those in this case (a position that Community Bank
vigorously opposes and which we adopt only for purposes
of this discussion), there is at present no judgment in
the Ell case which can operate as an estoppel against the
12

bank. Upon reversal of the judgment in that case and its
remand for a new trial, it ceased to have any potential
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect. Restatement
of judgments 163, Comment D2 §41 (1942). (Emphasis added)
See also Sutton v. Hirvonen, 775 P. 2d 448, 452 (Wash. 1989).

POINT III.
THE APPEAL FILED SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS BEING FRIVOLOUS,
THE BRIEF FILED ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE
DISREGARDED, AND DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED DEFENDANT.
Of

the

approximately

23

cases

one-third

cited

by

appellants

in

relate to res judicata

their
and

brief,

collateral

estoppel which, as pointed out above, are irrelevant and immaterial
to any issue raised by the appeal.

Of the 18 pages contained in

Appellants7 Brief, one-half (9 pages) deal substantially with the
matter of res judicata and collateral estoppel. There are ten (10)
or more misstatements of fact or mischaracterizations of the law
in the Brief, of which the following are a few prime examples:
At the top of page 2 of the Brief:
Trial court refused to recognize the decision of
Judge Croft awarding Plaintiff Ruth Hiltsley judgment in
the amount of $4,924.66, which judgment has never been
overturned or on which there has been no contrary
evidence submitted since the trial before Judge Croft.
(Emphasis added)
Judge Croft's decision relating to such award to Plaintiff,
was based upon a finding that Plaintiff had an interest in the
account as a tenant in common.

This Court need only refer to the

decision of the Supreme Court in remanding the case to the trial
court in Hiltsley, supra, which reversed and remanded the case for
joinder of the Etta Wood estate, and the testimony of Ms. Macias,
13

called to testify in the trial before Judge Frederick, in answer
to Mr. King's question:
Q And the signature card shows that what, is this a —
this does not show—does it show a joint tenancy o r —
A Yes, it is a joint tenancy account. It's a passbook
savings that—the number in the book indicate that it is
a passbook.
The ownership is M. J. Hiltsley, Ruth
Hiltsley and H. M. Ryder. (R. Second Trial Transcript,
p.48)
At the bottom of page 3 of the Brief, in referring to the
assets of Etta Wood:
... which were given by him during his lifetime to
Defendant Hallalene M. Ryder.
It is uncontested that two of the three accounts were left to
Defendant as a surviving joint tenant, at Hiltsley's death, not
given to her during Hiltsley's lifetime.
In several places, most notably, pages 9 and 15 of the Brief,
it states that Judge Croft's decision concerning a tracing of funds
has not been controverted or ever disputed.

The Court is referred

to Defendant's Brief, earlier filed in the Utah Supreme Court on
the first appeal, specifically Point IB, pages 9-14, which argues
the insufficiency of the evidence used by Judge Croft in support
of his decision tracing the funds.
At the top of page 15 of Appellant's Brief, the case of First
Security Bank v. Demiris, 10 Ut. 2d 405, 354 P. 2d 97, is referred
to as holding that a wife's withdrawal of funds from a joint
account "severed the joint tenancy and the husband could then show
ownership of the whole account deposited from his independent
funds."
14

Counsel has misstated the court's holding.

The language of

First Security Bank v. Demiris, supra, at page 99, cites the
following statement found in In re Kelley's Will, (1933) 146 Misc.
353, 263 N.Y.S. 661, 667:
The withdrawal of monies from a joint account does
not destroy a joint tenancy, if one was created. It
merely opens the door to competent evidence, if
available, that no joint tenancy was originally created
or intended.
The Utah Supreme Court in referring to such holding of the New
York case said, at page 99 "The above rule and the reasons
supporting it are applicable to the instant case."
At the top of page 16 of the Brief, it states:
Both appellants join in the proposition that the
determination by Judge Croft of the rights of the parties
to the funds that were in the hands of deceased and
disposed of by him during his lifetime became a final
disposition of this matter when the Supreme Court did not
reverse the decision of Croft and remitted the matter for
the joinder of Etta Wood's estate.
and on page 17:
Judge Croft's decision, while returned to the trial
court for the joinder of Etta Wood's estate as a party,
has never been reversed or modified in its primary and
fundamental holdings. There has never been a claim made
that he erroneously interpreted the law or found facts
which were not supported by evidence.
As stated above, these are only some of the examples of the
misstatement of fact and mischaracterization of law found in the
Brief.
Rule 24 (k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure under the
title "Requirements and Sanctions" states as follows:
All briefs under this rule must be concise.
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial
15

or scandalous matter. Briefs which are not in compliance
may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorneys' fees
against the offending lawyer. (Emphasis added)
Rule 3 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
as follows:
Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court
determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall
award just damages, which may include single or double
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party. The court may order that
the damages be paid by the party or the party's attorney.
In the case of O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P. 2d 306 (Utah App.
1987), Justice Davidson, writing for the Court, at pages 3 09-310,
stated:
PLaintiff requests attorney's fees incurred in
responding to this appeal. This court in Eames v. Eames,
735 P. 2d 395, 398 (Utah App. 1987), awarded attorney
fees in a situation in which the "totality of defendant's
argument" caused us to believe the appeal was frivolous.
That alone meets the technical requirements of R. Utah
Ct. App. 33(a).... For purposes of Rule 33(a) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals we define a "frivolous
appeal" as one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis as defined in Rule 40(a) .... Defendant's claims on
appeal simply controvert the findings of the court. The
claims are not only without merit but are also without
basis in law or fact.
Plaintiff is entitled to the
benefit of Rule 33(a). (Emphasis added)
In Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 (Utah App. 1988)., Justice
Garff, writing for the court, at page 3 69 stated:
However, sanctions should be imposed when "an appeal
is obviously without any merit and has been taken with
no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in
delayed implementation of the judgment of the lower
court; increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of
the time and resources of the lower court. (Emphasis
added)
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In the case of Eames v. Eames, 735 P. 2d 395 (Utah App.
1987)., Justice Davidson, writing for the court, stated:
The court recognizes the right of a party to argue
in an attempt to correct what that party deems to be
error in the court below. However, when there is no
basis for the argument presented and when the evidence
or law is mischaracterized and misstated, the court must
question the party's motives. (Emphasis added)
The same problems found in the Utah Court of Appeals decisions
above are also found in the appeal of Plaintiff and Intervenor.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court in the trial on remand from
the Utah Supreme Court should be affirmed, the Brief filed by
Appellant should be stricken; the appeal should be determined to
be frivolous, and Defendant should be awarded damages including
double costs and attorneys' fees against Plaintiff, Intervenor, and
their counsel.
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